We analyze the price of anarchy (POA) in a simple and practical non-truthful combinatorial auction when players have subadditive valuations for goods. We study the mechanism that sells every good in parallel with separate second-price auctions. We first prove that under a standard "no overbidding" assumption, for every subadditive valuation profile, every pure Nash equilibrium has welfare at least 50% of optimal -i.e., the POA is at most 2. For the incomplete information setting, we prove that the POA with respect to BayesNash equilibria is strictly larger than 2 -an unusual separation from the full-information model -and is at most 2 ln m, where m is the number of goods.
payment formula than that of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction that is used in practice (see e.g. [6] ). The combinatorial auctions that are used in practice -for example, government auctions to sell wireless spectrum -are carefully crafted to achieve a number of economic and computational design goals, but the existence of dominant strategies is not one of them [13] .
If mechanisms without dominant strategies are important to analyze, how should we do it? An obvious idea is to use an equilibrium concept to predict a mechanism's plausible outcomes, and to identify the performance of a mechanism with that of its equilibria. For example, a typical goal in classical mechanism design is to prove that one or all equilibria of a mechanism implement a given social choice rule. Here, we take a quantitative approach and ask how well the equilibrium performance of a mechanism approximates that of a socially optimal outcome. Thus our work applies the "price of anarchy" framework to the analysis of mechanisms without dominant strategies.
Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
Our most basic results are for the following model. There are n players and m goods. Each player i has a private valuation v i that describes its value for each of the 2 m − 1 non-empty bundles of goods. Every valuation v i is subadditive, meaning that v i (S ∪ T ) ≤ v i (S) + v i (T ) for every pair S, T of subsets of goods. The objective is to maximize the social welfare n i=1 v i (S i ) over all allocations S 1 , . . . , S n of the goods to the players. This goal can be achieved using the VCG mechanism, in which each player has a dominant strategy that is to truthfully reveal its entire valuation to the mechanism. There are numerous challenges to implementing this mechanism (see e.g. [1] ), such as the exponential amount of information that each player needs to communicate up front. By contrast, in a combinatorial auction with item bidding, each player submits one bid for each good -m bids instead of 2 m − 1 -and each good is sold separately using a Vickrey auction.
There are at least three different motivations for studying combinatorial auctions with item bidding. The most obvious one is as a simple and practical alterna-tive to combinatorial auctions with dominant strategies. The second, noted in [4] , is that combinatorial auctions with item bidding are, in effect, already being used: a bidder that is trying to buy a bundle of goods in parallel on eBay (say) is implicitly participating in such an auction. The third motivation is theoretical, and suggests a general approach to welfare maximization when players have high-dimensional type spaces. Suppose players' valuations lie in the set V . The VCG mechanism has dominant strategies and is welfare-maximizing, but if V is too rich then asking a player to describe fully its valuation is unrealistic. A natural alternative is to accept bids only from a smaller set W ⊆ V of easily describable valuations and to run the VCG mechanism as if bidders' true valuations lie in W . Truthfulness is lost (as the true valuations may lie in V \ W ), but there is hope for good performance at equilibrium if W is a "good enough approximation" of V . Our results provide positive results on this exact issue for the case where V and W are the sets of subadditive and additive valuations, respectively -with additive valuations, the VCG mechanism is equivalent to a separate Vickrey auction for each good.
Our Results
We prove worst-case bounds on the welfare of equilibria in combinatorial auctions with item bidding when players have subadditive valuations. While there is no hope of proving any bound on the welfare of every equilibrium, even for the single-item Vickrey auction 1 , our guarantees apply to every equilibrium with "no overbidding", meaning that the sum of a player's bids on a subset of goods is at most the player's value for that subset. This bound is tight in the worst case.
Our second result is for the incomplete information model, where each player's valuation is drawn independently from a (player-specific) distribution over subadditive valuations. The distributions are commonly known and the actual valuations are private. Note that the full information model is the special case in which every distribution is a point mass.
We show that there can be Bayes-Nash equilibria with no overbidding with expected welfare less than half of the expected welfare of an optimal allocation. Nevertheless, we prove the following guarantee.
Result 2. The expected welfare of every Bayes-Nash equilibrium with no overbidding in a combinatorial auction with item bidding and subadditive valuations is at least 1/(2 ln m) times that of the welfare-maximizing allocation.
We also extend this second guarantee to the expected welfare of every coarse correlated equilibrium 3 -and hence to the special cases of mixed Nash and correlated equilibria -in the full information model.
Finally, we prove that both of our bounds degrade gracefully as we relax the subadditivity and "no overbidding" constraints. For example, if we assume only that every player overbids by at most some constant factor, then our upper bounds grow only by constant factors.
Our Techniques
We prove our first result in two parts. The interface between the two parts is the following single-player "game", which essentially models the best-response problem faced by a player in a combinatorial auction with item bidding. An adversary assigns each good j a non-negative price p(j). The player chooses a bid vector a, subject to no overbidding with respect to its valuation v. The player wins good j if and only if a(j) ≥ p(j). The player's payoff in this game is defined to be v(S) + j / ∈S p(j), where S is the set of goods that it wins.
The first part of our proof is a reduction, from proving a guarantee for equilibria in combinatorial auctions with item bidding to proving a guarantee for this single-player game. Let V be a class of valuations. Suppose that for every valuation v ∈ V and price vector p, the player has a countering bid vector a with payoff at least v(M )/α, where M is the set of all goods. (Note that if prices are high, the player cannot win all the goods without overbidding.) We prove that, in this case, every pure Nash equilibrium with player valuations in V and no overbidding has welfare within a 2α factor of optimal. The second part of our proof provides, for every subadditive valuation v and price vector p, a bid vector a with payoff at least v(M ).
Our second result requires a different approach. One concrete reason is that, as we show, the guarantee of 2 for pure Nash equilibria does not hold for BayesNash equilibria. Intuitively, the proof approach above fails because, in the incomplete information model, players best respond to distributions over price vectors rather than to fixed price vectors. Our solution is to reverse the order of the player and the adversary in the single-player game above: a player with a valuation v ∈ V first chooses a bid vector a without overbidding, and then the adversary picks a price vector p to minimize the player's payoff. We prove that if for every v ∈ V the player has a bid vector that guarantees a payoff of at least v(M )/β for every price vector, then every Bayes-Nash equilibrium with player valuations in V and no overbidding has expected welfare within a 2β factor of optimal. This argument applies also to coarse correlated equilibria in the full information model. Finally, we prove that β ≤ ln m for the class of subadditive functions. Our proof uses a greedy Set Cover-style argument to show that all subadditive functions are "ln mapproximations" of fractionally subadditive functions, a class of valuations for which β = 1.
Related Work
Our work is closely related to that of Christodoulou, Kovács, and Schapira [4] , who were the first to study what we are calling combinatorial auctions with item bidding, and who proved special cases of our two main results for submodular valuations. 4 Their approximation guarantee for Bayes-Nash equilibria is a factor of 2 (like for pure Nash equilibria), in contrast to our bound of 2 ln m.
Subadditive valuations are much more expressive, and hence technically more challenging, than submodular valuations. For example, for the problem of computing a welfare-maximizing allocation, a simple greedy algorithm produces a 2-approximation with submodular valuations [10] , while the only known polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithm with subadditive valuations is the ingenious LP rounding scheme by Feige [7] . Thus our first result, that every pure Nash equilibrium with no overbidding is already a 2-approximation with subadditive valuations, is arguably surprising.
5 Also, our lower bound that rules out an approximation guarantee of 2 for Bayes-Nash equilibria with subadditive valuations offers a formal separation between the submodular and subadditive cases. This lower bound also implies that no proof of our first result can follow the "smoothness paradigm" of [14] and hence must be novel in some sense. In contrast, the proofs in [4] can be recast as smoothness proofs in the sense of [14] .
Since the work of Christodoulou, Kovács, and Schapira [4] , a few other papers applied the price of anarchy framework to mechanisms without dominant strategies [2, 8, 11, 12] . We describe the two closest to our work. First, Lucier and Borodin [12] study conditions under which an α-approximation algorithm for welfare maximization can be combined with the VCG payment rule to obtain a mechanism with equilibria that are (close to) α-approximate. The results in [12] do not seem to have any interesting implications for combinatorial auctions with subadditive valuations (with item bidding or otherwise). Second, Paes Leme and Tardos [11] prove that, under a no overbidding assumption, the welfare of all Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria in the GSP sponsored search auction are within a constant factor of optimal. Like the present work, the proofs in [11] do not follow the smoothness paradigm in [14] , and the bounds for Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria are different. However, Paes Leme and Tardos [11] give no lower bound that proves an unavoidable separation between the two types of guarantees (as we do here).
Preliminaries

Combinatorial Auctions In a combinatorial auction (CA), there is a set of n players and a set M of m goods (or items). Each player i has a valuation v i : 2
M → R + that describes its value for each subset of the goods. We always assume that v i (∅) = 0 and
. . , v n }, we denote the welfare-maximizing outcome by OP T (v).
We consider CAs with item bidding. Each player i submits m bids, one for each good. Letting b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . b n ) denote the bid profile, each good j is allocated to the highest bidder i at a price equal to the second-highest bid max k =i b k (j) for that item. We use X i (b) to denote the goods allocated to player i in this bid profile and
) to denote the social welfare of the resulting allocation. Player i's utility from this bid profile is
As noted in the Introduction, no welfare guarantees are possible (even for the single-item Vickrey auction) without restricting players from using bids that are much larger than their valuations. For a valuation v and parameter γ ≥ 1, call a bid vector b γ-conservative
The strategy space of a γ-conservative player is, by definition, the set of bid vectors that are γ-conservative for its valuation. We sometimes call such bid vectors feasible for the player.
An Auction as a Game
The Full Information Model. Players generally have no dominant strategies in a CA with item bidding, so we consider several types of equilibria. In the simplest full-information model, players' valuations are commonly known. For a fixed valuation profile v = {v 1 The pure price of anarchy (POA) is the ratio of the objective function values of the socially optimal outcome and the worst pure Nash equilibrium: (2.1) pure POA = max b: a pure Nash eq.
SW (OP T (v)) SW (b) .
There are CAs with item bidding and valuation profiles such that there is no pure Nash equilibrium (see the Appendix D), in which case the pure POA is undefined. Appendix B reviews three standard and more permissive equilibrium concepts for the full-information model (mixed Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria) and proves a bound for the corresponding POAs. The Incomplete Information Model. When players' valuations are not commonly known, the standard model is a Bayesian game [9] . Let V i denote the possible valuations of player i. The common prior is a distribution D i over valuations in V i for each player i, and the corresponding product distribution
vi over bid vectors feasible for v i . A mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a strategy B i for each player i such that no player i can gain by a unilateral deviation:
and every (pure) deviation b i that is feasible for v i . The expected optimal social welfare is E v∼D [SW (OP T (v))] and the POA is the ratio of this quantity and the worst expected social welfare of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium: 
Note that a valuation is subadditive in the usual sense if and only if it is 1-subadditive.
Theorem 3.1. For every CA with item bidding that has γ-conservative players with α-subadditive valuations and at least one pure Nash equilibrium, the pure POA is at most α(γ + 1).
In particular, the pure POA is at most 2 when players have subadditive valuations and do not overbid on any subset. The upper bound is tight in the worst case for subadditive valuations for all values of γ (see Appendix A) and also for 1-conservative bidders for all values of α.
The next lemma is central in our proof of Theorem 3.1. It concerns the best response of a single player against "posted prices" on the goods. More precisely, for a γ-conservative player with an α-subadditive valuation v and a vector p of nonnegative prices on the goods, we use u(a, p) to denote the utility the player gets with the bid vector a:
where S = {j ∈ M : a(j) ≥ p(j)}. In our proof of Theorem 3.1, we apply this lemma to each player, where the prices p are set by the other players' bids. 
Proof. For convenience, we define the "translated utility" byũ(a, p) = u(a, p) + j∈O p(j). We show that there is a 1-conservative bid vector a withũ(a, p)
The proof is by induction on the number of goods. Our inductive hypothesis is: for every set O of goods, prices p on O, and α-subadditive valuation v, there exists a 1-conservative bid vector a and a partition 
For the inductive step, let O be a set of > 1 goods. There are now two cases, depending on whether or not there is a set A for which
If
where U is the goods of O \ A won with the bid a.
Extend a to a bid vector on all of O by padding it with zeros on A; it remains 1-conservative. Using inequalities (3.3) and (3.4), we derivẽ
which completes the inductive step.
Finally, using the definition of translated utility and α-subadditivity, we conclude that our bid a satisfies
We now prove our upper bound on the pure POA of CAs with item bidding (Theorem 3.1).
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Fix a valuation profile
an optimal allocation for it. We consider an arbitrary pure Nash equilibrium b = {b 1 , b 2 . . . b n }. Let A i denote the goods allocated to player i in this equilibrium.
Fix a player i and define p i (j) = max k =i b k (j) for each good j. Invoking Lemma 3.1, there is a feasible bid vector a i such that
where u i is defined as in (3.2) . Combining this inequality with the Nash equilibrium condition,
Adding these inequalities over all players and using the fact that
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that players are γ-conservative. Rearranging terms shows that SW (b) ≥ SW (OP T )/α(γ + 1), as desired.
Separation Between Pure and Bayes-Nash POA
We next show that the upper bound in Theorem 3.1 does not carry over to the incomplete information model and the Bayes-Nash POA. This stands in contrast to many previous works, where the worst-case pure POA coincides with that of several more general equilibrium concepts (including the Bayes-Nash POA). Intuitively, our proof of Theorem 3.1 does not extend directly to the incomplete information case because it is not a "smoothness proof" in the sense of [14] . Unlike in [14] , the Nash equilibrium hypothesis is invoked in the proof of Theorem 3.1 with a candidate deviation a i that depends on the bid vectors b −i of the other players. The following example implies, in particular, that there is no "smoothness proof" of a tight bound on the pure POA of CAs with item bidding and subadditive valuations. The Example. There are 8 items to sell and 2 players. The items are divided into two sets X 1 and X 2 , each with 4 items. Let a = 0.24, b = 0.521, and p = 0.97.
Each player i has a deterministic valuation on the set X i+1 and a distribution over additive valuations on the set X i . (All additions to indices are interpreted modulo 2.) Precisely, for each player i and j ∈ X i , v i ({j}) is a with probability p and is b with probability 1 − p. The full valuation is
It is easy to see that each of the valuations in the support is subadditive.
One possible allocation is to award set X 1 to player 2 and set X 2 to player 1. The social welfare of this allocation is
Now consider the strategy profile in which player i bids v i (j) for every j ∈ X i and 0 for every j ∈ X i+1 . The expected welfare of this strategy profile is
and hence the Bayes-Nash POA is bounded away from 2.
It remains to verify that the strategy profile above is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Since there are only two players, the bids of each player act as posted prices for the other. We show that for each fixed valuation of player 1, the maximum expected utility the player can achieve, given the distribution over posted prices set by player 2, is at most that in the suggested strategy profile. Player 2 can be treated similarly.
Fix a valuation v 1 for player 1. Player 1's utility in the proposed strategy profile is v 1 (X 1 ) ≥ 4a = 0.96. Since v 1 (S) = max{v 1 (S∩X 1 ), v 1 (S∩X 2 )} for each set S and player 1 currently wins all of X 1 , we can focus on deviating bids that are non-zero only on goods of X 2 .
Case (i): Suppose that player 1 bids at least b on some element of X 2 . Recall that deviating bids must be 1-conservative. Since 2b > 1, player 1 can bid b on at most one element in the set X 2 . Since 2a + b > 1, while bidding b on some element the player can bid at least a on at most one other element. If the player bids at least b on one element, at least a but less than b on another, and less than a on the rest, its expected utility is at most (1 − p) Case (ii): Player 1 bids at least a but less than b on 0 < h < 3 items in X 2 and less than a on the rest. Any subset of X 2 has value 1. The elements on which the player bids a will be won if the posted price is at most a. No set would be won when all the posted prices are b. The expected utility is 1
Case (iii): Player 1 bids at least a but less than b on all four items in X 2 . In this case the whole set X 2 with value 2 will be won when all the posted prices are a. A set with value 1 will be won when some of the posted prices are b and nothing will be won when all the posted prices are b. The expected utility is at most 2p 
Statement of Main Result Our technical approach motivates stating the bound in terms of fractionally subadditive valuations. Precisely, a valuation v is β-fractionally subadditive if for every subset T ⊆ M there is a bid vector a satisfying j∈S a(j) ≤ v(S) for each subset S ⊆ T (i.e., 1-conservative) such that
j∈T a(j) ≥ v(T )/β. 6 The case of β = 1 was previously considered by Feige [7] , who also showed that the classes of fractionally subadditive and XOS valuations coincide.
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 5.1. For every CA with item bidding that has γ-conservative players with β-fractionally subadditive valuations, the Bayes-Nash POA is at most β(γ+1).
We supplement this bound with a proof that every α-subadditive valuation is also α ln m-fractionally subadditive, which implies the special case noted at the beginning of the section. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1
The following lemma plays a role analogous to that of Lemma 3.1; the key 6 The name "fractionally subadditive" comes from an alternative definition: if for every "fractional cover" of a subset T of goods -meaning nonnegative coefficients λ 1 , . . . , λ k for sets
The equivalence of the two definitions follows from linear programming duality. difference is that we exhibit a good bid vector for each player that is independent of the other players' bid vectors (at the cost of a worse bound). (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of 1-conservative bids such  that, for every bid profile b = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . b n },
Proof. Since each player i has a β-fractionally subadditive valuation v i , there is a 1-conservative bid vector a i so that
We can assume that a i is zero outside of the set O i . Suppose player i bids a i and wins a set X of goods. Since the player bids zero outside the set
where in the first inequality we use that a i is 1-conservative, in the second that
for every good j that the player does not win with the bid a i , and in the last that a i satisfies (5.6). Summing these inequalities over the players and proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 (further details omitted) establishes the result:
We now use Lemma 5.1 to complete the proof of the upper bound on the Bayes-Nash POA claimed in Theorem 5.1. The argument bears similarities to the "smoothness arguments" in [14] ; the results in [14] do not immediately apply here, however, because our outcome space (allocations of goods) does not coincide with the set of strategy profiles (bid vector profiles).
Proof of Theorem 5.1:
n } be a corresponding optimal allocation. For a player i, we can expand the Bayes-Nash equilibrium condition in terms of the common prior and the chosen mixed strategy to obtain: for every pure deviation a i ,
where we are using the fact the players have independent valuations. Summing this inequality over all the players and invoking Lemma 5.1, we obtain
For every bid profile b and player i,
We obtain
Next we introduce a fresh copy of a distribution over v −i on the outside. Combining what we know and rearranging,
Reorganizing terms proves that the POA is at most β(γ + 1). 
Proof of Theorem 5.2
We now show that approximately subadditive functions are also approximately fractionally subadditive, with a ln m factor loss in the approximation. 7 This logarithmic loss is necessary in the worst case (see Appendix C).
Proof of Theorem 5.2:
Given an α-subadditive valuation v over a subset T of m goods, we explicitly define a bid vector a using a variation on the greedy Set Cover algorithm (see Algorithm 5.1). We prove that the output a of Algorithm 5.1 is 1-conservative and satisfies j∈T a(j) ≥ v(T )/(α ln m), which completes the proof. 
with the last inequality following from the α-subadditivity of v. This completes the proof.
Conclusion
Our work suggests a number of interesting open questions.
• What is the POA of Bayes-Nash equilibria in combinatorial auctions with item bidding and subadditive valuations? There is a significant gap between our upper and lower bounds.
• Identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in a combinatorial auction with item bidding and subadditive valuations. (Cf., Appendix D.)
• As outlined in the Introduction, our results quantify the equilibrium efficiency loss that results from forcing bidders with subadditive valuations to submit additive bids. Is there a more general theory about the equilibrium efficiency loss caused by this type of "valuation compression"?
A Lower Bound for the Pure POA There are 2 players and 2 goods A and B. The valuation function is defined as follows:
One allocation is to allocate {A} to player 2 and {B} to player 1, and the social utility of this outcome is 2(γ+1). Alternatively, player 1 could bid (γ, 0) and player 2 could bid (0, γ) to win A and B respectively. The social utility is then 2. We show that this choice of bids is a pure Nash equilibrium. The pure POA is then at least (γ + 1).
Consider player 1. Its utility in the proposed strategy profile is 1. If the player wins item B through some deviating bid since the price on that item is γ his utility is still at most 1. Hence the player will not wish to deviate. Similar reasoning shows that player 2 does not want to deviate.
B POA of Coarse Correlated Equilibria in the Full Information Model
A mixed strategy for player i is a distribution B i over bid vectors. Let B denote the product of the players' distributions and B −i the analogous product for the players other than i. The mixed profile {B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n } is a mixed Nash equilibrium if for each player i and bid vec-
Every pure Nash equilibrium is also a mixed Nash equilibrium. A distribution B over bid profiles -which now need not be a product distribution -is a correlated equilibrium if for every player i, bid vector b i for a profile b in the support of B, and feasible bid vector
Such a distribution is a coarse correlated equilibrium if for every player i and
Every mixed Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium and every correlated equilibrium is a coarse correlated equilibrium. For each of these three equilibrium concepts, the corresponding price of anarchy is defined analogous to (2.1), where the denominator is the worst-case expected social welfare of an equilibrium. See e.g. Young [16] for more details on and interpretations of these three equilibrium concepts.
We now prove a bound of β(γ +1) for POA of coarse correlated equilibria. Due to the inclusion properties of the equilibrium concepts the same bound applies to the mixed POA and correlated POA. Proof. Let B be the distribution over different bid profiles in the coarse correlated equilibrium. Let O = {O 1 , O 2 , . . . O n } be the optimal allocation for the players' valuation profiles. The coarse correlated equilibrium condition for a player i is 
Then,
Reorganizing the above inequality establishes that the POA is at most β(γ + 1).
C Approximating Subadditive Valuations with Fractionally Subadditive Valuations
The following example establishes that there exist subadditive valuations for which a better approximation by a fractionally subadditive valuation than in Theorem 5.2 is not possible. It is based on a lower bound for the worst-case integrality gap of Set Cover linear programs (see e.g. [15] ).
For an integer k, we construct a valuation function on a set of m = 2 k − 1 items. Assign a number to each item and let i denote a k-bit binary vector representing the integer i. i is a k-dimensional vector over GF [2] (the field of integers modulo 2). i · j denotes the dot product of the two vectors modulo 2. Define set S i = {j : i · j = 1}. Each such set contains (m + 1)/2 elements and each element is contained in (m + 1)/2 sets.
Define v(S i ) = 1. For any other set, v(S) is the smallest number of sets S i whose union contains S. Note that this valuation is sub-additive, as for any two sets S, T , the collections of sets that cover S and T combine to cover S ∪ T . We show that for the set M , every 1-conservative vector a satisfies j∈S a(j) ≥ v(M )/Ω(log m). On the other hand, we claim that v(M ) is at least k = log m. Consider p < k sets. Let i 1 , i 2 . . . i p be the corresponding indices. Let A be a matrix containing vectors i 1 , i 2 . . . i p . This matrix has rank less than k, hence its null space has rank at least one. Thus there is a vector j such that i t · j = 0 for each t. This implies that j is not in S it for any i t and these p sets do not cover M . Thus it takes at least k sets to cover M and v(M ) ≥ k.
We conclude that the valuation defined in this example is Ω(ln m)-fractionally subadditive.
D Example with No Pure Nash Equilibrium
We describe below an instance in which there is no pure Nash equilibrium. There are 2 players and 3 items. The players' valuation functions are defined as follows: Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium in which the players bid conservatively.
Case (i): Player 2 wins some items in the Nash equilibrium. Player 1 then does not win the whole set M and its utility is at most 1.6. Suppose player 2 bids x, y, z respectively for the 3 items. Since the player is 1-conservative. x + y ≤ 1, y + z ≤ 1, z + x ≤ 1. Then x+y +z ≤ 1.5. Player 1 then can bid x+ , y + , z + for some > 0 while still satisfying conservation constraints to win all items and obtain a utility at least 3.2 − 1.5 = 1.7 > 1.6.
Case (ii): Player 1 wins all items in the Nash equilibrium. Player 2's utility then is zero. Suppose player 1 bids x, y, z respectively for the three items. Due to conservation constraints, x + y ≤ 1.5 and so at least one of x, y (x, say) is then less than 1. Player 2 can then bid 1 on the first item to win it and obtain a positive utility.
In either case one of the players has an improving unilateral deviation hence this is not a Nash equilibrium.
